A teleofunctional theory accounts for the distinction in terms of the development and function of explicit temporal representation. That is, when a creature is able to consider alternative paths of action, it becomes necessary to conceive of alternate future times as distinct from the present moment. The developmental, functional approach of a teleofunctional theory is promising in its ability to integrate research from diverse empirical fields for support of its claims.
Consciousness and Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Direct download 4 more. Cognitive Sciences. In this thesis I present a phenomenological investigation of our experience of time — of things as they fall within time — and suggest that something important goes missing in recent debates. This is the notion of a point of view. I believe that articulating the sense in which we have a point of view in time, and what this is a point of view upon, is crucial to an account of how things are for an experiencing subject.
In the I argue that theorists appeal to the specious present under two guises without explicitly distinguishing between them; yet these two conceptions are not identical, while one entails the other the reverse is not true. In the second chapter I defend an appeal to the specious present against proponents of what I refer to as snapshot models of temporal experience.
I argue that perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non-zero temporal extent as such. In the third chapter I discuss how we are to characterise experience over intervals of time of a greater extent than the specious present.
I offer a proposal on which a subject is invariably presented with a positive temporal extent, with this interval marking the partition between the past and the future for the subject. In the fourth chapter I compare and contrast our experience of objects and events, and our experiential point of view in space and in time.
This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles.
The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use.
This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience. This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to "cut and paste" from the original file.
To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Last update of current version: July 13th, Direct download. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical and conceptual considerations It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval.
On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more nuanced view of memory.
Cognitive Sciences, Misc in Cognitive Sciences. History of Western Philosophy, Misc. Neuroscience in Cognitive Sciences. Philosophy, Miscellaneous. Psychology in Cognitive Sciences.
Theories of Memory in Philosophy of Mind. We use the hierarchical nature of Bayesian perceptual inference to explain a fundamental aspect of the temporality of experience, namely the phenomenology of temporal flow. The explanation says that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception stems from probabilistic inference that the present cannot be trusted.
The account begins by describing hierarchical inference under the notion of prediction error minimization, and exemplifies distrust of the present within bistable visual perception and action initiation. Distrust of the present is then discussed Finally, we discuss how there may be individual differences in the experience of temporal flow, in particular along the autism spectrum.
The resulting view is that the sense of temporal flow in conscious perception results from an internal, inferential process. The central point is that the consciousness is an advanced information channel.
Consciousness is not the seat of the self or free will. The action is in the sub-consciousness brain systems. Consciousness is a "just so story teller" consciousness collects and correlates scenes into sequential presentations. What is the Specious Present? Which is its duration? And why, ultimately, do we need it to figure in our phenomenological account of temporal perception?
In this paper, after introducing the role of the Specious Present in the main models that account for our phenomenological present, and after considering the deflationary objection by Dennett that the debate relies on the fallacy of the Cartesian Theatre of Mind, the idea that it is meaningful to ask where and when an experience becomes conscious , I claim—thanks to a spatial analogy—that there could be a good criterion to distinguish between a present experience and a past experience, that there are good reasons to sustain the Specious Present while snapshots are in no sense part of our phenomenological life , and that there could be a precise way to define the nature—and to measure the duration—of the Specious Present; as I will clarify, our capability and possibility to act and react are central in this perspective.
If we accept this change of perspective, there is a definite sense in which the Specious Present is part of our temporal phenomenology. A comparison of reaction time and verbal report in the detection of masked stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology — Garde, M. Cortex 71— Glynn, I. Consciousness and time.
Nature — Gomes, G. The timing of conscious experience: a critical review and reinterpretation of Libet's research. Consciousness and Cognition 7: — Husserl, E. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time — , trans.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. James, W. The Principles of Psychology. London: MacMillan. Kandel, E. Principles of Neural Science. London and Sidney: Prentice Hall. Libet, B. Bosten: Birkhauser. MacIntyre, N. Non-conscious choice in cutaneous backward masking. Neuroreport 7: —
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